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ABSTRACT 
Forest sector governance reform is frequently promoted as a policy tool for 
achieving favorable livelihood outcomes in the low income tropics. However, there 
is a dearth of empirical evidence to support this claim, particularly at the household 
level. Drawing on the case of a major forest sector governance reform implemented 
in Uganda in 2003, this study seeks to fill that gap. The research employs a quasi-
experimental research design utilizing pre and post reform income portfolio data for 
a large sample of households surrounding three major forests in western Uganda; a 
control group is included in the design.  
On private forest land overseen by the decentralized District Forestry Service 
there has been no significant change in average annual household income from 
forests, and the share of total income from forests has only slightly increased. For 
households living adjacent to Budongo Central Forest Reserve, overseen by the 
parastatal National Forestry Authority, there have been significant gains in average 
annual household income from forests, as well as the share of total income from 
forests. However, increases are limited to households in the highest income quartile 
and are primarily attributed to the sale of illegally harvested timber. The findings 
from this study challenge the view that governance reforms result in favorable 
livelihood outcomes for the poorest. Policy makers should carefully consider the 
incentives facing both forestry officials and local resource users with particular 
attention to increasing awareness of the value of trees and forests, and facilitating 
legal opportunities for rural smallholders across all income categories to sustainably 
engage in forest product harvesting and value addition.   
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Are the Rural Poor Gaining? 
Pamela Jagger 
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1. INTRODUCTION  
Recent estimates suggest that governance reforms transferring rights and 
responsibilities for natural resource management to local governments or local 
resource users are currently underway in approximately 60 developing countries 
(Agrawal 2001; WRI 2003). Reforms are generally motivated by the failure of 
centralized states to provide basic infrastructure and services, high levels of 
corruption within centralized systems, and the desire to foster democratic 
institutions that take into account the needs of a diverse citizenry (Vedeld 2003; 
Wunsch and Olowu 1990). Improved livelihoods for rural people living in or near 
forests is one of the most commonly cited expected outcomes of forest sector 
governance reforms (Agrawal and Gibson 1999; Agrawal and Ostrom 2001; Fisher 
et al. 2005; WRI et al. 2005; Meinzen-Dick and Knox 2001). However, there is a 
dearth of empirical data regarding whether and under what conditions favorable 
livelihood outcomes are achieved (Bardhan 2002; Meinzen-Dick et al. 2004).  
This paper explores changes in the role of forest income in rural livelihood 
portfolios that have resulted from a major forest sector governance reform 
implemented in Uganda in 2003. The reform involved changes in the ownership and 
management of 85 percent of Uganda’s forested land. A new forest policy, a 
strategic forest sector plan, and new legislation were developed during the forest 
sector review process (Government of Uganda 2001, 2004; MWLE 2002).   The 
centralized Forest Department was dismantled, and the decentralized District 
Forestry Service (DFS) and the for-profit parastatal National Forestry Authority 
(NFA) were created. Though significant institutional change has taken place, there 
is limited empirical evidence to indicate how the benefits associated with forests 
have been re-oriented to local resource users.  
A strong case can be made for choosing Uganda to evaluate the effect of 
forest sector reforms on rural livelihoods. First, Uganda is ranked second in sub-
Saharan Africa (after South Africa) with respect to progress on government wide 
decentralization initiatives that encompass democratic processes and foundations 
(Ndegwa 2002). Second, Uganda is a leader in sub-Saharan Africa with respect to 
forest sector reforms. Major forest sector reforms have been undertaken in 
Cameroon, Ghana, Malawi, South Africa, and Senegal, and more recently in Kenya, 
Mali, Tanzania, and Rwanda. Both Kenya and Rwanda have predicated their own 
forest sector reform processes on the Ugandan experience. Third, forest-based 
livelihood improvements for the rural poor are a major focus of the new Uganda 
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Forestry Policy as well as the National Forest Plan (Government of Uganda 2001, 
2002). Finally, much of the impetus for the forest sector reform was related to the 
fact that Uganda’s forests are under serious threat (MWLE 2001a). Rapid changes 
in forest cover and quality pose a significant threat to rural livelihoods.   
The research employs a quasi—experimental research design comparing both 
pre and post reform income portfolio data for a large sample of households 
surrounding three major forests in western Uganda. Outcomes for two treatment 
groups are considered. The first group is comprised of households living in or near 
privately held forests managed by the decentralized District Forestry Service. The 
second treatment group includes households living adjacent to Budongo Central 
Forest Reserve that were affected by the transition from the Forest Department to 
the for-profit parastatal National Forestry Authority. A control group comprised of 
households living adjacent to Rwenzori Mountains National Park, managed by the 
centralized Uganda Wildlife Authority, is included in the design.  
Empirical results are reported in the fifth section. Finally, the findings of the 
study are summarized, and policy implications presented.  
The paper is organized as follows: in the next section the literature related to 
governance reform and livelihoods is reviewed. Background information on 
Uganda’s forest sector reform and a summary of institutional changes and 
motivations for livelihood outcomes are presented. The fourth section describes the 
research design, study area, and methods used.  
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Improvements in livelihoods are a primary rationale for governance reform, 
particularly those that involve devolution of authority to local governments or local 
resource users (Meinzen-Dick and Knox 2001). Natural resource focused 
governance reforms have the potential to affect household assets in two ways: they 
have the potential to increase household assets and the returns to those assets; 
and they may increase access to assets not owned by the household (World Bank 
2008). Reforms are expected to allow poor people to make their assets more 
productive via the mechanism of government policies that support local 
organization and decision—making around forest use, and greater participation of 
local forest users in markets for forest products. Improved property rights for local 
resource users to forests, specific forest resources and forest product markets is 
the most common mechanism through which returns to assets are improved (Ribot 
2002; Ribot and Peluso 2003). Having a larger and more diverse portfolio of rights 
as well as short and long run decision making authority over resources facilitates 
opportunities to utilize forest resources in a variety of different ways, including: 
supporting current consumption; use in times of need (as safety nets); and as 
pathways out of poverty. In particular, the right to access and withdraw high value 
forest products has the potential to lift households out of poverty (Angelsen and 
Wunder 2003).   Clear and secure rights are a crucial aspect of reform 
implementation if reforms are to be successful in improving the asset base of rural 
households. Secure land rights allow households to obtain credit, reduce risk 
associated with investment, and provide incentives to sustainably manage 
resources (DFID 2007; FAO 2002; Deininger 2003; SIDA 2007).  3 
 
There is a strong link between the democratic decentralization literature and 
the community based natural resource management (CBNRM) literature. Often 
reforms involve the state sharing management or enforcement responsibilities with 
local communities, or provide new opportunities or incentives for community based 
initiatives. When CBNRM is successful, it may lead to improved natural resource 
management (World Bank 2008). When local resource users are involved in the 
formation of rules regarding the use of forests, they are expected to respect and 
enforce rules to a higher standard then when they are not involved in rule 
formulation (Gibson, McKean, and Ostrom 2000). It is also argued that local 
resource users have a much greater knowledge of local conditions and are therefore 
better equipped to identify and prioritize environmental problems (Larson 2002). 
Finally, both the financial and transaction costs of sustainable management, which 
ensures medium to long run income flows, should be lower when local resource 
users are integrated into the management of forests (Kaimowitz et al. 1998)  
Reforms often alter the organizational or administrative structure that 
oversees forest management. Organizations and their employees have underlying 
incentive structures that motivate the way in which policies are implemented. If 
authorities are unwilling to substantively relinquish property rights or alter power 
relationships, then reform are at best partial and the opportunities for rural 
livelihood improvements and sustainable management are limited (Agrawal and 
Ostrom 2001; Crook and Manor 1998; Ribot 1999).  
Bardhan (2002) argues that empirical evidence as to whether or not 
decentralization reforms lead to significant changes in incomes or other measures 
of livelihoods are absent from the literature. However, several recent studies 
consider the linkage between livelihood outcomes and forest sector governance 
reforms. There is evidence that rural households experience gains in income from 
forests as a result of reforms. Studies from Malawi (Jumbe and Angelsen 2006) and 
Ethiopia (Jagger, Pender, and Gebremedhin 2005) found that devolved forest 
management led to increases in income from forests for rural smallholders. 
However, both studies found a high degree of variation across communities and 
households affected by the reform. Studies that examine governance reforms in 
cases where the communities are involved in the distribution of timber concessions 
find that communities and households are better off after decentralization reforms 
(Oyono 2005; Palmer and Engel 2007), though again with a high degree of 
variation between communities and households. Communities often benefit from in 
kind payments that support the development of rural infrastructure including 
schools and health centers, or receive direct cash payments from small scale timber 
concessions.  
Political connectedness emerges as an important variable influencing reform 
outcomes for the poor. Recent studies from Vietnam (Sikor and Nguyen 2007) and 
Indonesia (McCarthy 2004) found that while devolution does generate benefits for 
the local poor, local power relations and the institutions regulating access to higher 
value forest resources are excluding the very poor from benefiting from these 
reforms. Crook and Sverrison (2001) in a cross country study on the welfare 
impacts of decentralization reforms pointed out that central government 
commitment to pro—poor policies and engagement with local elites to ensure 
unbiased implementation of reforms are important for livelihood gains. There are 
numerous examples of local elites, NGOs and other special interests dominating 4 
 
local decision making processes regarding the assignment of rights, which may 
undermine outcomes for the rural poor (Agrawal 2001; Platteau and Abraham 
2002; Ribot 1999). A key finding from the synthesis research on the topic of 
decentralization is that if reforms are to have welfare enhancing effects at the level 
of the rural household, attention needs to be paid to the structural inequities that 
emerge across the various landscapes in which reforms are implemented (Larson et 
al. 2007; Ribot 2003; WRI et al. 2005).  
UGANDA’S FOREST SECTOR GOVERNANCE REFORM 
The Forest Sector Umbrella Program (FSUP) initiated in 1999 was the Government 
of Uganda’s approach to reforming the forest sector. FSUP was a multi—donor 
program, led by the Government of Uganda through the Ministry of Water, Lands 
and Environment (MWLE), and coordinated by the Forest Sector Co—ordination 
Secretariat (now the Forestry Inspection Division within the MWLE). The goals of 
FSUP were two—fold: to create a positive, effective, and sustainable policy and 
institutional environment for the forest sector in Uganda, and, through this, to 
increase economic and environmental benefits from forests and trees, particularly 
for the poor and vulnerable (MWLE 2004a). Uganda’s forest sector governance 
reform was part of a larger government—wide restructuring motivated by the 1995 
Constitution and the 1997 Local Government Act intended to downsize the public 
service, rationalize government functions, and improve the effectiveness and 
efficiency of public service provision (MWLE 2006).  
The FSUP supported a number of processes in the reform of the sector, 
including: a forest sector review; and the development of the Uganda Forest Policy 
(MWLE 2001), the National Forest Plan (MWLE 2002), and the National Forestry and 
Tree Planting Act (Government of Uganda 2004). A major outcome of the reform 
process was the abolition of the centralized Forestry Department and the creation 
of the decentralized District Forestry Service and the for-profit parastatal National 
Forestry Authority. The Uganda Wildlife Authority continues to manage the 15 
percent of Uganda’s forests and woodlands in national parks and game reserves 
(Table 1).  










































71.1 28.9  38.0  33.1  28.9 
Woodland 88.3  11.6  78.0  10.3  11.6 
Plantation 93.7  6.1  33.1  60.6  6.1 
Total 85.1  14.8  70.2  14.9  14.8 5 
 
Notes:  Local Forest Reserves account for less than 1percent of the total forest area of Uganda.  
Source: Adapted from MWLE (2001), data from National Biomass Survey, 1999. 
The three forest management authorities are characterized in Table 2. The 
District Forestry Service is an example of democratic decentralization to local 
governments. As noted in Table 1, 70 percent of Uganda’s forests are currently 
managed by local governments. An important distinction is that prior to the reform, 
forests outside of protected areas and central forest reserves were ungazetted 
public land. Since the promulgation of the 1998 Land Act and the 2003 National 
Forest and Tree Planting Act, forests outside of protected areas and central forest 
reserves are now considered privately owned. The National Forestry Authority took 
over Central Forest Reserves where the majority of Uganda’s high value timber and 
forest biodiversity is concentrated. In addition to the development of the District 
Forestry Service and the National Forestry Authority, the Forestry Inspection 
Division (FID) was created. The FID, housed in the Ministry of Water, Lands and 
Environment, is responsible for policy and regulation in the forestry sector 
overseeing the activities of both the NFA and DFS. It is noteworthy that FID has 
been the most poorly funded of the three newly created institutions, and thus has 
had very limited capacity for bureaucratic oversight and support to either the 
District Forestry Service or the National Forestry Authority.   
Table 2: Characterization of Forest Governance Organizations in Uganda   
 District  Forestry 
Services 
National Forestry Authority  Uganda 
Wildlife 
Authority 
Governance type   Democratic 
decentralization to local 
government  






transportation and sale 
permits;  
Timber harvesting and 
charcoal burning permits 
Donors (years 1–4);
 Lease of 
reserve forests or sale of trees for 
timber harvesting; Auction of 
illegally harvested timber; Leasing 
of reserve land for plantation 
development; Contract services 














Level of staffing  Inadequate for mandate  Adequate for mandate Adequate  for 
mandate 
Notes:  A parastatal is an organization which has some political authority and serves the state 
indirectly. While clearly defined as a parastatal in the policy documents, NFA also has a revenue 
generating function. The NFA Start—up Fund was supported by the European Union (EU), and the 
governments of Norway (NORAD) and the United Kingdom (DFID) who provided funds to meet initial 
capital investment and start—up operational costs. The EU provided financial assistance through the 
Forest Resources Management and Conservation Program (FRMCP) (MWLE 2006). 
Sources: Data sources include author’s primary research,  MWLE (2006), MWLE (2002), and UWA 
(2004).  
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During the reform process several mechanisms were identified for promoting 
favorable livelihood outcomes. Opportunities for achieving outcomes are different 
for forests on private and customary lands vs. gazetted forests in Central Forest 
Reserves. Similarly the incentives and constraints for achieving outcomes vary with 
the capacity of the organizations charged with implementing policies, and also with 
the incentives and constraints of local and non-local resource users. Mechanisms 
identified as opportunities for catalyzing favorable livelihood outcomes are 
summarized in Table 3.  




Small business development in the forestry sector 
Security of land and tree tenure 
Use of appropriate technologies to enhance food security (for example, improved 
stoves) 
Promoting tree planting and forest conservation for soil fertility 
Establishment of community forests 
National Forestry 
Authority 
Increased access to forest resources for subsistence use especially wild foods, 
building materials and medicines 
Sell seed and provide technical advice to land owners that want to establish 
plantations 
Ecotourism cash or in kind contributions to communities 
Provisions for the development of Collaborative Forest Management Agreements 
between CFR adjacent communities and the National Forestry Authority 
Source:  MWLE (2002).  
While the mechanisms for achieving improved livelihoods are clearly spelled 
out in strategy and legislative documents that accompanied the reform, there 
remains very limited capacity on the part of the District Forest Service to carry out 
activities such as promoting business development and facilitating tree planting. A 
major challenge for the District Forestry Service has been continued contestation of 
land tenure and security. Though provisions exist with the new Constitution (1995), 
the Land Act (1998), and the National Forestry and Tree Planting Act (2004), to 
clearly define tenure rights, historical land conflicts between the Buganda and 
Banyoro ethnic groups, and in—migration and rapid land clearing to establish de 
facto property rights by migrant communities from both southwestern and northern 
Uganda have contributed to continued deforestation and forest fragmentation. The 
District Forestry Service has neither the mandate nor the capacity to address larger 
scale issues of land tenure in rural Uganda. The National Forestry and Tree Planting 
Act (2004) clearly articulates’ provisions for establishing community forests. 
However, given relative land values (that is, agricultural land is typically 2 to 3 
times more valuable than forested land), and the high demand for agricultural land 
incentives for communities to seek opportunities to establish community forests in 
the absence of a high degree of extension focused on the potential long—term 
benefits are weak.  
The National Forest Authority has the budgetary and human resource 
capacity to implement their mandate; however attaining fiscal self sufficiency has 
directed the focus of their work toward large scale business opportunities such as 7 
 
plantation establishment, and revenue generating enforcement such as the 
confiscation of illegally harvested timber. Significant stakeholder engagement and 
planning went into the development of guidelines for establishing collaborative 
forest management agreements (CFMAs) between the National Forestry Authority 
and villages adjacent to Central Forest Reserves (MWLE 2003b). However, the 
process is complex and bureaucratic, and few NFA employees are effectively trained 
in initiating and negotiating CFMAs.    
METHODS 
Research Design  
To make claims about causal relationships between governance reforms and various 
outcomes a quasi—experimental research design is required. To understand how 
the reform has affected a particular unit of observation, be it a demographic group 
such as the rural poor or specific forest area, it is necessary to have data from 
before the reform was implemented to compare with data collected some time after 
implementation has taken place (Bardhan 2002). In addition, it is necessary to 
have a counterfactual, or a control group, to account for changes that occur due to 
other factors. The control group serves as an indicator of what would have 
happened in the absence of the reform (World Bank 2008). This study employs a 
quasi—experimental research design called the nonequivalent comparison group 
design (Shadish, Cook, and Campbell 2002). Households in forest sites affected by 
the reform (that is, treatment groups) are compared with households in a forest 
site that was not affected by the reform (control group).
2  In this case the pre—
reform and post—reform samples are independent. Household level data from the 
first and second time period are analyzed together as a pooled cross section.    
Site and Sample Selection 
The baseline data for this study were collected in 2003 in four major forest areas 
purposively selected by the Wildlife Conservation Society as representative of forest 
types and management regimes in Uganda (Table 4). Data collection for the follow-
up study took place in three major forest sites in western Uganda.  As the focus of 
the study is Uganda’s forest sector reform, the objective of the forest site selection 
process was to maximize institutional variation and minimize variation of other 
important exogenous variables such as forest type. Kasagala Central Forest Reserve 
was not included in the follow-up study; Kasagala Central Forest Reserve has the 
same pre and post reform governance structure as the Budongo forest site but is a 
woodland site, a clear outlier among forest types represented in the baseline study.   
In each of the study areas there are multiple forest authorities present. However, 
each site has a dominant forest management authority that local resource users 
                                                      
 
2 The non-equivalent comparison group design is among the most common of quasi-experimental 
designs. Variants include treatment groups and untreated comparison or control groups with 
dependent (that is, pre and post test data collected on the same units) and independent samples. Due 
to the non-equivalency of the comparison and control groups, selection bias is assumed to be present. 
Several methods are available to test for both the external and internal validity of the research design 
(Shadish, Cook, and Campbell 2002).       8 
 
perceive as controlling forest access, harvesting, and marketing of various forest 
products. 
Table 4: Forest Areas Included in Baseline (WCS) Study 










Bugoma Central Forest 
Reserve 
Tropical high forest  Forest Department  District Forestry 
Service 
Budongo Central Forest 
Reserve 
Tropical high forest  Forest Department  National Forestry 
Authority 
Kasagala Central Forest 
Reserve 
Woodland  Forest Department  National Forestry 
Authority 
The forest sites are located in the northernmost section of the Albertine Rift; 
the area stretching between Lake Albert and Lake Edward.
3  The Albertine Rift is 
one of the most diverse ecosystems in Africa with more than 7,500 species of 
animals and plants, including many endemics. Western Uganda has the highest 
incidence of tropical high forest in Uganda (50 percent or approximately 500,000 
hectares). According to data collected during the National Biomass Study published 
in 1999, well over 80 percent of tropical high forest in western Uganda was fully 
stocked (MWLE 2001a). This is in contrast to Uganda’s central region which has 
approximately 300,000 hectares of tropical high forest, the majority of which is 
degraded. The characteristics of the forest sites included in the follow-up study are 
highlighted in Table 5. 
   
                                                      
 
3 The Albertine Rift has been identified as an Endemic Bird Area by Birdlife International, an 
Ecoregion by the World Wildlife Fund, and a Biodiversity Hotspot by Conservation International 
http://albertinerift.org/arift-home/arift-whatis. Accessed 30 October 2007.  9 
 
Table 5: Characterization of Forest Sites   
  Rwenzori Forest Site 
(Control) 
Bugoma Forest Site 
(Treatment 1) 














Tropical high (Buliisa 
and Masindi)  
Major forest products 
















(poles and ropes) 
Thatch 
Major forest products 





Districts (number of 














Agro ecological   Montane system 
characterized by high 
rainfall 
Western banana, 




Banana, millet, cotton 
(Buliisa), low rainfall; 
and Western banana, 
coffee, cattle system 
(Masindi), moderate 
rainfall 
Altitude (m.a.s.l.)  1500–1750  1000–1500  900–1200 
Common agricultural 
crops 
Banana; sweet potato; 
cassava; Irish potato; 
Arabica coffee; barley 
(at high altitudes);  
Banana; coffee; 
maize; sweet potato; 
cassava 
Millet, sorghum and 
maize (Buliisa);  
Banana; coffee; 
maize; sweet potato; 
cassava (Masindi) 
Livestock production  Small ruminants and 
poultry usually fed 
crop residues 
Cattle, small 
ruminants and poultry 
pasture system 
Both intensive and 
extensive cattle 
production; small 
ruminants and poultry 
Sources: Author’s primary data, MAAIF (1995), and Nzita and Niwampa (1993).  
Baseline Data 
The baseline data for this study were collected in late 2003 immediately prior to the 
implementation of the forest sector reform. The baseline study was conducted by 
the Wildlife Conservation Society, Albertine Rift Program with support from the 
European Union Forest Resources and Conservation Management Program (Bush et 
al. 2004). The primary objective was to quantify the contribution of forest products 
to household income portfolios. The data collection involved a household survey 10 
 
designed to collect information on both subsistence and cash income generating 
activities.  
In each of the four forests WCS visited 11 or 12 villages, for a total sample of 
46 villages and roughly 640 households. WCS employed a multiple stage stratified 
random sampling process to select the villages included in the baseline study. As 
the focus of the study was communities adjacent to forests, the sampling was 
constrained to parishes (the second lowest administrative unit in the Ugandan local 
government structure) immediately adjacent to the forest. In order to get good 
spatial representation around the perimeter of each forest site, parishes were 
divided into 12 units with equal number of parishes. From each of the 12 units, one 
parish was randomly selected. Within each selected parish a list of villages was 
compiled and one village was randomly selected from each parish. Within each 
village participatory rural appraisal techniques including a wealth ranking exercise 
were used to categorize each household within the village as poor, average, or 
wealthy. From each group five households were randomly selected for the 
household interview in the baseline study (Bush et al. 2004).
4  
Follow-up Data 
The nested research design of forest sites, villages, and households was limited to 
the three selected forest sites that were included in the WCS baseline survey. From 
each forest site the number of villages included in the sample was reduced from 12 
to 6, largely due to financial and logistical constraints.
5  However, the number of 
households surveyed in each village was increased to provide a representative 
sample of households within each village.  
The 6 villages were randomly selected using a stratified random sampling 
method that took into consideration the distribution of the baseline survey villages 
by forest site and by district in order to maximize variation across the seven 
districts in the study (n=18 villages).
6 After the random selection was completed 
the location of the villages was checked to ensure sufficient geographic distribution 
around each forest site. The random selection process yielded relatively uniform 
distribution of villages around each of the three forest sites (Figure 1).  
 
                                                      
 
4 Household level data for the baseline study are not a random sample of the population of 
households. Ideally 1/3 of the sample would be drawn from each of the three wealth categories. The 
distribution of households in the baseline dataset across the three wealth categories is: 28 percent 
poor; 34 percent average; 38 percent wealthy.  
5 Difference-of-means tests were conducted on total average household income, total average 
forest income, and the share of income from forests to compare the 34 villages included in the WCS 
study with the 18 villages selected for the follow-up study to ascertain the representativeness of the 
villages selected. There was no significant difference of means for the variables total household 
income and share of total income from forests. However, total household income from forests was 
significantly different for households falling with the larger sample of 34 villages and the sub-sample 
of 18 villages included in the follow-up study.   
6 At the time of the WCS study all of the villages within the Budongo forest site fell within Masindi 
District. In July 2006 Buliisa District was created. The villages for the Budongo site were not selected 
proportionally according to the new districting, but rather randomly from among the 12 villages in the 
Budongo forest site.  11 
 
Figure 1: Map of villages included in both the baseline and follow-up 
studies 
 
Thirty households were randomly selected from each village (n=540 
households). A list of households residing in each village was compiled, drawing 
upon information from village registers, lists provided by village leaders, and 
information from key informants. Polygamous households were listed according to 
the wife’s name; each wife was considered a separate household unless key 
informants indicated that wives jointly undertook important livelihood activities 
such as cooking and cultivating. Lack of household level identifiers such as 
household names or Global Positioning System coordinates in the baseline study 
made it impossible to study the same households over time. This has implications 
for the type of analysis possible and the interpretation of results.  
The field work for the follow-up study was undertaken between October 2006 
and August 2007. Each household was visited quarterly. During each visit data on 
the household’s income portfolio, expenditures, and time use were collected. In 
addition, each quarterly survey had a short section that was administered only 
during that quarter. Data were collected on household demographics; assets and 12 
 
resource use; general household welfare during the past five years; perceptions of 
access rights to forests; household access to forests, forest products and forest 
product markets; and perceptions of changes in forest cover and quality during the 
past five years. 
Analysis 
The effect of the forest sector reform on rural income portfolios is evaluated using 
three measures: annual total household income, annual household forest income, 
and the share of annual household income from forest products.
7  While income is 
an imperfect measure of overall household welfare, it is relatively easy to measure 
and can be used as a reasonable proxy for welfare (Angelsen and Wunder 2003).   
In order to be able to compare incomes across households a standardized 
unit of measure is required. Interhousehold variations in size and demographic 
composition are taken into account following Cavendish (2002).
8  Equivalence scale 
adjustments are typically comprised of three components: a time weighting equal 
to the proportion of the year each household member spends in the household; a 
nutritional weight allocated according to the age and gender of each household 
member; and an economy of scale weight (Ibid). Unadjusted estimates of total 
income were divided by the household size in adjusted annual equivalents to 
produce total household income per adjusted adult equivalent units.
9 Adjusted 
annual incomes from the baseline data were adjusted to real values by multiplying 
incomes in 2003 by 6.38 percent which was the average rate of inflation in Uganda 
during the period 2003 through 2007.
10  
A major challenge for this study is that we do not have a true panel dataset 
with the same households both before and after the reform. The regression analysis 
combines the baseline data with the follow-up data to create a pooled cross section 
over time.
11 This data structure fits with the research design in that it assumes that 
during each year of data a new random sample is taken from the relevant 
population. While pooled cross sectional data is treated as a cross sectional dataset 
                                                      
 
7 The paper follows the standard income definition. Agricultural and forest income, for example, is 
gross value of products sold or consumed minus input costs. Following this, the value of family labor is 
not deducted, while the costs of hired labor are.   
8 See Cavendish (2002) page 56 for a detailed discussion of adjusting crude income to adult 
equivalent units.  
9 Because the study area does not have a significant proportion of households with migrant 
laborers we assumed all individuals to be time weighted with 100 percent of their time in the 
household.  
10 Uganda Revenue Authority. 2007. 
http://www.ugrevenue.com/exchange_rates/previous.php?date=January+2008&Submit=Show. Accessed 28 
January 2008. 
11 Given that this study does not use panel data (that is, tracks the same households over time) – but 
rather uses pooled cross sectional data from two independent random samples, the potential effect of 
attrition due to factors including harassment from forest officials, economic opportunity elsewhere etc. 
cannot be ascertained. Data on the high proportion of households that have been in the village for 
greater than 10 years provides relative assurance that the sample drawn for the follow-up study is 
relatively representative of the population of households in the 2003 baseline study conducted by the 
Wildlife Conservation Society. Approximately 80 percent of household heads in the follow-up sample 
have lived in their current village for greater than 10 years.    
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for analysis purposes, it is important to include a dummy variable for year to 
account for aggregate changes over time (Wooldridge 2002).  
The effect of the forest sector governance reform on forest income is 
evaluated using a program evaluation technique known as the “difference—in—
difference” (DID) method. The difference—in—difference method allows for the 
consideration of both group specific and time specific effects. Effects can be 
estimated using descriptive statistics (that is, double difference mean statistics) and 
also econometrically (Wooldridge 2002). Table 6 summarizes the variables required 
to estimate the effect of the reform on livelihood outcomes. 
Table 6: Variables Required to Estimate Double-Difference Mean Statistic 
  Bugoma Forest Site 
(Treatment 1) 




Before T1B  T2B  CB 
After T1A  T2A  CA 
The double difference of the means of the treatment effect is modeled as 
follows:  
 
Treatment effect1 (District Forestry Service)=( T1A – T1B)-(CA – CB)              (1) 
 
Treatment effect2 (National Forestry Authority)=( T2A – T2B)-(CA – CB)                 (2) 
Alternatively the difference-in-difference estimator can be used to model 
outcomes econometrically as follows:   
 
Yi = β0 +  β1treatment_dfs + β2treatment_nfa+ β3time + β4treatment_dfs*time+ 
β5treatment_nfa*time + εi               ( 3 )  
While comparing difference- in-difference means for both group and time 
specific effects can provide useful information, equations 1 and 2 assume that the 
policy change is not systematically related to other factors that affect outcome 
variables. In most cases the model in equation 3 is extended to include additional 
covariates that account for the possibility that random samples within a group have 
systematically different characteristics across the two time periods (Wooldridge 
2002). Thus, the effect of the governance reform on the three livelihood outcome 
variables of interest is modeled econometrically according to the following equation: 
 
Yi = β0 +  β1treatment_dfs + β2treatment_nfa+ β3time + β4treatment_dfs*time + β5treatment_nfa*time 
+β6land + β7labor + β8capital +  β9minforest + β10village + εi       
    (4) 
β1treatment_dfs is a dummy variable that indicates where the household is in 
the first treatment group (that is, under the jurisdiction of the District Forestry 
Service), and β2treatment_nfa is a dummy variable that indicates whether the 
household is in the second treatment group (that is, under the jurisdiction of the 
National Forestry Authority) . β3time is a dummy variable that indicates if the 
household fell in the 2003 or 2007 sample. β4treatment_dfs*time and 14 
 
β5treatment_nfa*time are interaction variables that indicate whether the household 
falls in the treatment group and in the after the reform time period. Coefficients for 
these interaction variables measure the magnitude of change in the independent 
variable that can be attributed to the reform. β6land  is a vector of variables that 
indicate the endowment of land for each household. β7labor is a vector of variables 
that indicate the household’s human capital and over all labor supply. β8capital is a 
vector of variables that indicate the household’s available capital assets.  
β9minforest is number of minutes it takes to travel from the household to the 
nearest forest by the most common means of transportation. β10village is a vector 
of variables that indicate several of the fixed conditions associated with each 
village. εi is the error term which accounts for effects that are not captured by other 
variables.  
Models with left censored dependent variables (for example, adjusted annual 
household income from forests, and share of annual household income portfolio 
from forests) are estimated using the Tobit regression model which account for the 
non—linear nature of data with a significant number of zeros (Long 1997).  
RESULTS 
Adjusted household total income by forest site and income quartile is presented in 
Table 7. With one exception, there have been increases in income across all forest 
sites and income quartiles. In all forest sites the largest increases in income are 
observed in the lowest income quartile. The general trend is an equalizing of 
incomes over time. Relatively similar percentage change across forest sites and 
income quartiles in the control group and treatment groups indicates that the 
reform has had a limited effect on total income.  
Table 7: Adjusted Annual Household Total Income by Forest Site and 
Income Quartile, UgShs.  







     2007
 
Rwenzori Forest Site (Control Group)   n=85  n=163     
Adjusted (AEUS) total income, UgShs 
0–25  122 910  260 769  137 859  112.2 
26–50  227 569  436 117  208 548  91.6 
51–75  451 950  660 575  208 625  46.2 
76–100  976 262  1 128 113  151 851  15.6 
Average across all quartiles  439 119  569 902  130 783  29.8 
Bugoma Forest Site (Treatment 1)  n=85  n=166     
Adjusted (AEUS) total income, UgShs 
0–25  112 484  254 597  142 113  126.3 
26–50  233 245  425 750  192 505  82.5 
51–75  439 966  607 328  167 362  38.0 
76–100  1 255 551  1 326 027  70 476  5.6 15 
 
Average across all quartiles  562 047  650 150  88 103  15.7 
Budongo Forest Site (Treatment 2)  n=86  n=168     
Adjusted (AEUS) total income, UgShs 
0–25  113 083  247 308  134 225  118.7 
26–50  232 714  433 286  200 572  86.2 
51–75  422 618  609 373  186 755  44.2 
76–100  1 106 264  1 241 129  134 865  12.2 
Average across all quartiles  432 643  681 108  248 465  57.4 
Notes: Pre-reform (2003) estimates calculated from data collected by the Wildlife Conservation 
Society in 2003. During the follow-up study the average exchange rate was 1 USD=1,817 UgShs. 
Absolute income from forests and the share of total income from forests are 
important indicators of how the reform has affected the contribution of forests to 
rural livelihoods. Average adjusted annual household forest income, the share of 
income from forests, and the percent changes in both are presented in Table 8. It is 
important to note that absolute income from forests declined by a relatively small 
amount (roughly 23 000 UgShs. or $13 USD).
 12 This indicates that the Rwenzori 
forest site is a relatively good control group for this study. Large changes in 
average household income from forests in the control group site would suggest a 
significant event such as a change in market access (that is, the building of a road), 
or a major change in enforcement capacity of the Uganda Wildlife Authority, which 
would make it more difficult to interpret the findings for the treatment groups.   
 
                                                      
 
12 During the follow-up study the average exchange rate was 1 USD=1817 UgShs. (Uganda Revenue 
Authority. 2007. 
http://www.ugrevenue.com/exchange_rates/previous.php?date=January+2008&Submit=Show. 
Accessed 28 January 2008) 16 
 
Table 8: Adjusted Annual Household Forest Income by Forest Site and Income Quartile, UgShs.  



















Rwenzori Forest Site (Control Group)   n=85  n=163      n=85  n=163   
  Adjusted (AEUS) forest income, UgShs       
0–25 27  747  50 851  23 104  83.3 19.6 19.6  0.0 
26–50 60  352  74 925  14 573  24.1 27.2 17.2  -10.0 
51–75 112  548  105 597  -6 951  -6.2 24.4 17.1 -7.3 
76–100 307  799  204 909  -102 890  -33.4 31.4 17.1  -14.3 
Average across all quartiles  124 796  101 472  -23 324  -18.7 25.8 17.9 -7.9 
Bugoma Forest Site (Treatment 1)  n=85  n=166      n=85  n=166   
Adjusted (AEUS) forest income, UgShs         
0–25 24  647  36 032  11 385  46.2 23.3 14.4 -8.9 
26–50 37  748  65 189  27 441  72.7 16.6 15.4 -1.2 
51–75 62  257  74 974  12 717  20.4 13.4 12.4 -1.0 
76–100 181  585  122 166  -59 419  -32.7 15.1 10.2 -4.9 
Average across all quartiles  83 717  74 550  -9 167  -10.9 17.1 13.1 -4.0 
Budongo Forest Site (Treatment 2)  n=86  n=168      n=86  n=168   
Adjusted (AEUS) forest income, UgShs         
0–25 24  313  21 852  -2 461  -10.1 22.2  8.4  -13.8 
26–50 29  253  35 417  6 164  21.1 12.5  8.5  -40 
51–75 25  086  60 396  35 310  140.8 5.9  10.2 4.3 
76–100 105  113  231 988  126 875  120.7 9.5  18.9 9.4 
Average across all quartiles  43 926  99 389  55 463  126.3 13.0 12.1 -0.9 
Notes: Pre-reform (2003) estimates calculated from data collected by the Wildlife Conservation Society in 2003.  
During the follow-up study the average exchange rate was 1 USD=1,817 UgShs.   17
Estimates of the average change in annual household income from forests for 
the first treatment group suggest that District Forestry Service management has 
had a limited effect on forest income; as with the control group, absolute income 
from forests for the Bugoma forest site slightly decreased (-9 167 UgShs. or $5 
USD). Changes in forest income decomposed by income quartile reveal the 
differential effects of the reform. In the Bugoma forest site increases in income 
from forest products are associated with the lower three income quartiles. A similar 
trend is observed in the control group. Income from forests had declined among the 
wealthiest households in both the control group and the corresponding income 
group in the Bugoma forest site.  
The mean share of income from forests has changed very little for 
households in the Bugoma forest site (-4.0 percent). Though the absolute income 
from forests has increased for households in the lower income quartiles, the relative 
importance of forests to the overall income portfolio has declined for very poor 
households (-9.3 percent). In the control group site the relative importance of 
forest income only slightly increased for very poor households (+0.8 percent). The 
comparison between the Bugoma forest site and the control group suggests that 
forests are still relatively important for the lowest income quartile in the control 
group site and are less important for the lowest income households in the Bugoma 
site. In Rwenzori the wealthiest households have the largest decline in the share of 
income from forests (-11.1 percent), and in the Bugoma site it is the poorest 
households that have the largest decline in proportion of income from forest 
products (-8.9 percent). These figures point to the relative importance of forests in 
the livelihoods of poor versus wealthy households. 
In the Budongo forest site a different pattern emerges from the 
decomposition of forest income by wealth category. Comparisons between the 
second treatment group, NFA management in the Budongo forest site, and the 
control group indicate that average household incomes from forests have 
substantially increased (+55,463 UgShs., or $31 USD) since the reform was 
implemented. While income from forests has increased for all income categories, by 
far the largest gains are observed in the highest two income quartiles. Average 
household forest income in the wealthiest income quartile has increased by roughly 
127,000 UgShs., or $70 USD.  
Households in the lowest income quartile in the Budongo forest site have had 
the largest decline in share of income from forests (-13.8 percent) while Budongo 
households in the highest income quartile have had a large increase in the share of 
income (+9.4 percent).  
In the Budongo field site the wealthiest households are making the largest 
gains. In the context of this study the interesting question is the contribution of 
forests to the overall change in income and whether that change can be linked to 
the reform. While income from forests is increasing, the absolute change in forest 
income does not account for the significant gains in total income that are observed 
in the both the Rwenzori and Bugoma forest sites. However, among the wealthiest 
households in the Budongo forest site more than two thirds of income gains 
between 2003 and 2007 can be attributed to forests.  
Double-difference mean statistics for the Bugoma Forest Site, the case of 
democratic decentralization to local government, are presented in Table 9. The   18
results in Table 9 demonstrate the impact of the forest sector reform on total 
household income, annual household income from forests, and the share of income 
from forests. The overall change in average total household income relative to the 
control group is a decline of approximately 43,000 UgShs., or $24 USD. However, 
most of this is attributed to changes in total income in the highest income quartile 
group. In the lower three income quartiles, changes in average total income in the 
Bugoma Forest Site relative to the control group have been relatively small. 
Table 9: Double Difference Estimates of Reform Impacts for Bugoma Forest 
Site 
Research Site  Bugoma Forest Site 
(Treatment 1) 





Annual Household Total Income (UgShs.) 




   
 n=166  n=85  n=163  n=85   
0–25  254 597  112 484  260 769  122 910  4 254 
26–50  425 750  233 245  436 117  227 569  -16 043 
51–75  607 328  439 966  620 575  451 950  -1 263 
76–100  1 326 027  1 255 551  1 128 113  976 262  -81 375 
Average, all quartiles  650 150  562 047  569 902  439 119  -42 680 
Annual Household Forest Income (UgShs.) 




   
 n=166  n=85  n=163  n=85   
0–25  36 032  24 647  50 851  27 747  -11 719 
26–50  65 189  37 748  74 925  60 352  12 868 
51–75  74 974  62 257  105 597  112 548  19 668 
76–100  122 166  181 585  204 909  307 799  43 471 
Average, all quartiles  74 550  83 717  101 472  124 796  14 157 
Share of Annual Household Income from Forests (percent) 




   
 n=166  n=85  n=163  n=85   
0–25 14.4  23.3  19.6  19.6  -8.9 
26–50 15.4  16.6  17.2  27.2  8.8 
51–75 12.4  13.4  17.1  24.4  6.3 
76–100 10.2  15.1  17.1  31.4  9.4 
Average, all quartiles  13.1  17.1  17.9  25.8  3.9 
Notes:  Pre-reform (2003) estimates calculated from data collected by the Wildlife Conservation 
Society in 2003. During the follow-up study the average exchange rate was 1 USD=1817 UgShs. 
Overall, the findings show that reform has had a very limited effect on the 
role of forest income in rural livelihood portfolios. In general, poorer households 
have had slight declines in absolute forest incomes, whereas the wealthiest 
households have had modest increases (roughly $24 USD per household). Overall, 
the share of total annual household income from forests has increased by 4   19
percent. As with changes in absolute forest income, the relative importance of 
forests to total household income has declined for the poorest households. The 
share of total household income from forests has modestly increased for the upper 
three income quartiles.      
Double-difference mean statistics for the Budongo Forest Site, the case of 
management by the for-profit parastatal National Forestry Authority, are presented 
in Table 10. The overall change in average total household income relative to the 
control group is significant - approximately 118,000 UgShs., or $65 USD.  With 
respect to absolute average household income from forests, households in the 
highest income quartile have experienced very large gains in income since the 
forest sector reform was implemented – approximately 230,000 UgShs., or $127 
USD. However, households in the bottom two income quartiles have experienced 
losses in total household income from forests. The share of total household income 
from forests has declined significantly for the poorest households, while households 
in the middle income quartiles have experiences modest gains in the importance of 
forests to their total income portfolio. However, it is the wealthiest households that 
show the largest gains, with an estimated 24 percent increase in the role of forests 
in their household income portfolios.  
Table 10: Double Difference Estimates of Reform Impacts for Budongo 
Forest Site 
Research Site  Budongo Forest Site 
(Treatment 2) 





Annual Household Total Income (UgShs.) 




   
 n=168  n=86  n=163  n=85   
0–25  247 308  113 083  260 769  122 910  -3 634 
26–50  433 286  232 714  436 117  227 569  -7 976 
51–75  609 373  422 618  620 575  451 950  18 130 
76–100  1 241 129  1 106 264  1 128 113  976 262  -16 986 
Average, all quartiles  681 108  432 643  569 902  439 119  117 682 
Annual Household Forest Income (UgShs.) 




   
 n=168  n=86  n=163  n=85   
0–25  21 852  24 313  50 851  27 747  -25 565 
26–50  35 417  29 253  74 925  60 352  -8 409 
51–75  60 396  25 086  105 597  112 548  42 261 
76–100  231 988  105 113  204 909  307 799  229 765 
Average, all quartiles  99 389  43 926  101 472  124 796  78 787 
Share of Annual Household Income from Forests (percent) 




   
 n=168  n=86  n=163  n=85   
0–25 8.4  22.2  19.6  19.6  -13.8 
26–50 8.5  12.5  17.2  27.2  6.0   20
51–75 10.2  5.9  17.1  24.4  11.6 
76–100 18.9  9.5  17.1  31.4  23.7 
Average, all quartiles  12.1  13.0  17.9  25.8  7.0 
Notes: Pre-reform (2003) estimates calculated from data collected by the Wildlife Conservation 
Society in 2003. During the follow-up study the average exchange rate was 1 USD=1817 UgShs. 
While the difference-in-difference of means or double-difference statistic is 
illustrative, multivariate regression analysis is used to further explore the effects of 
the reform.
13 The model is estimated with the addition of covariates that account for 
the possibility that the random samples within a group have systematically different 
characteristics in the two time periods. The coefficients of primary interest with 
respect to the understanding the governance reform and its affect on livelihoods 
are treatment_dfs*time (that is, effect for households living near forests overseen 
by the decentralized District Forestry Service post-reform; also Treatment 1) and 
treatment_nfa*time (that is, effect for households living near forests overseen by 
the parastatal National Forestry Authority post-reform; Treatment 2). Regression 
results are presented in Table 12.  
Table 11: Descriptive Statistics for Variables Used in Regression Analysis
 





Baseline Data (WCS 2003) 
Adjusted total income, UgShs.  253  468 222  453 727  43 649  2 544 500 
Adjusted forest income, UgShs.  253  84 747  169 884  0  1 470 238 
Share of income from forests, %  253  18.80  21.12  0  90.99 
Natural forest owned, hectares  253  0.13  0.80  0  7.80 
Arable land owned, hectares  253  1.42  1.81  0  12.00 
Female headed households  253  8.30  27.64  0  1 
Education level of household head (cf. None)     
  Some or completed primary  253  64.43  48.00  0  1 
  Secondary or above  253  19.76  39.90  0  1 
Dependency ratio
  253  151 104 0  600 
Household head has lived in village  
greater than 10 years 
253 83.80 36.92 0  1 
Value of assets, UgShs.  253  291 542  903 983  0  7 330 000 
Value of livestock, UgShs.  253  172 237  215 707  0  1 162 100 
Minutes to nearest forest  253  62.76  56.00  0  360 
Follow-up data (Jagger 2007) 
Adjusted forest income, UgShs.  499  632 285  471 252  115 714  4 336 662 
Adjusted total income, UgShs.  499  91 815  148 197  0  1 919 542 
Share of income from forests, %  499  14.33  12.54  0  74.48 
Natural forest owned, hectares  499  0.27  0.58  0  4.86 
                                                      
 
13 Descriptive statistics for the variables used in the regression analysis as summarized in Table 
11.    21
Arable land owned, hectares  499  1.58  1.32  0  9.31 
Female  headed  households  499 15.83 36.54 0  1 
Education level of household head (cf. None)     
  Some or completed primary  499  50.10  50.05  0  1 
  Secondary or above  499  28.46  45.16  0  1 
Dependency ratio
  499  142 112 0  700 
Household head has lived in village  
greater than 10 years 
499 80.76 39.45 0  1 
Value of assets, UgShs.  499  209 925  554 392  0  8 970 000 
Value of livestock, UgShs.  499  291 308  889 485  0  9 130 000 
Minutes to nearest forest  499  34.75  44.24  0  240 
Village level fixed effects 
Altitude, meters above sea level  18  1294  307  963  1872 
Households per hectare  18  0.36  0.17  0.10  0.73 
Minutes to nearest market for 
consumption goods 
18  61.11  53.81  0  195 
Ethnic diversity in village (c.f. one ethnic group)     
  2 or 3 ethnic groups   18  33.33  48.51  0  1 
  Between 4 and 10 ethnic groups  18  27.78  46.09  0  1 
  More than 10 ethnic groups  18  16.67  38.35  0  1 
Notes: During the follow-up study the average exchange rate was 1 USD=1817 UgShs. 
The dependence ratio is the number of household members under 15 years plus the number of 
household members over 65 years divided by the number of members between 15 and 65 years of 
age. The ratio is then multiplied by 100.  
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Table 12: Conditional Difference-in-Difference Estimates of Forest Income and Share of Income from 
Forests, Pooled Tobit Regression Results  
  Forest Income  Share of Income from Forests 

















Household Level Variables          
Treatment DFS  -90 575*  9 262  -410 928**  -8.49  11.03  -28.28** 
Treatment NFA  -184 205***  2 694  -604 519***  -13.83**  11.05  -38.47** 
Time  -20 606  24 270***  -104 688  -7.57***  -1.91 -14.52** 
Interaction DFS*Time  9 838  -17 469  55 130  3.06  -10.70*  11.58 
Interaction NFA*Time  95 972***  -27 753**  293 929**  6.37**  -14.97***  25.45*** 
Hectares of natural forest owned by 
household  10 776  -3 370  -9421  0.39  -1.97  -0.52 
Hectares of arable land owned by 
household  7 266*  248.12  15 316  -0.13  -0.96  1.21 
Female headed household  -28 692  -1 863  -111 244  -1.66  0.84  -5.77 
Household dependency ratio  -142.92***  -11.98 -270.82  0.00  0.00  -0.02 
Education level of household head (cf. 
None)          
  Some or completed primary  10 023  1 462  20 873  0.88  0.90  -0.60 
  Secondary or above  18 183  8 528  -44 072  -1.94  2.64  -6.62 
Household head has lived in village  
greater than 10 years  -31 218**  -8 046  -53 658  -3.11**  -7.22**  -2.43 
Total value of assets, UgShs.   0.0036  0.0052  0.0023 0.0000  0.0000**  0.0000 
Total value of livestock, UgShs.   -0.0073  -0.0235  -0.0156  0.0000 0.0000* 0.0000 
Time to nearest forest (minutes)  -400.35**  -114.85**  -921.92 -0.06***  -0.08*** -0.09** 
Village Level Fixed Effects          
Village altitude (masl)  -30.26  -1.68  -210.18  0.00  0.01  -0.01 
Households/hectare in village  -5 070  -4 787  -99 706  -0.25  -9.91  4.93 
Time to nearest market (minutes)  284.36**  61.81  684.33  0.04***  0.01 0.09**   23
Ethnic diversity in village (c.f. 1 ethnic 
group)            
  2 or 3 ethnic groups   13 978  -12 657  78 944  -2.21  -6.37  -1.85 
  Between 4 and 10 ethnic groups  37 999  -16 745  194 983*  -0.91  -8.52  5.55 
  More than 10 ethnic groups  118 820***  1 607  296 681**  6.11  -2.26  12.85 
            
Censored observations  61  21  12  61  21  12 
AIC 24.77  21.10  26.33  7.89  7.64  8.49 
BIC 13  735  3056.50  3979.56  1062.28  525.69  678.78 
Pseudo R-Squared  0.0049  0.0140  0.0070 0.0209  0.0397  0.0313 
Log-likelihood Ratio  -9277.58  -1960.26  -2412.63  -2941.33  -694.85  -762.24 
Notes: All models were checked for multicollinearity using the variance inflation factor (vif) test. The variance inflation factor is 4.68.  
*** Significant at the 1percent level; ** significant at the 5percent level; * significant at the 10percent level.    24
Controlling for household and village level characteristics, the net effect of 
the reform in the Bugoma forest site (that is, democratic decentralization to local 
government) is relatively small.  
The transition from the Forestry Department to the District Forestry Services 
appears to have had a negligible effect on average household income from forests 
(that is, an increase of 9,838 UgShs., or $5 USD).  Decomposition by income 
quartile reveals that the poorest households have lost a modest amount of forest 
income (17,469 UgShs., or $10 USD); whereas wealthy households have increased 
income from forests by an average of 55,150 UgShs., or $30 USD. The share of 
income from forests has increased 3.1 percent for the average household. 
Regression results decomposed by income quartile indicate that the share of 
income from forests has declined for the poorest households (10.7 percent) and 
increased for the wealthiest households (11.6 percent). The decline in the share of 
income from forests for poor households is statistically significant at the 10 percent 
level. Though the variable indicating female headed household is not statistically 
significant it is important to note that approximately 32 percent of households 
falling within the Bugoma Forest Site sample in the lowest income quartile are 
female headed.  For comparison purposes, 21 percent of households in the highest 
income quartile are female headed in this study site.  
These findings indicate that the transition to local government control over 
forest management has had a limited effect on livelihoods in the treatment group. 
Further, forest income for the poorest households has declined, while there have 
been gains in forest income for the wealthiest households. Limited capacity of 
District Forest Officers (DFOs) operating in the two Districts that are included in the 
Bugoma forest site is a possible explanation for the lack of attention to improving 
rural livelihoods. DFOs in Hoima and Kibaale Districts devote the majority of their 
time to the collection of district revenues for timber and charcoal transport. Their 
primary connection with local resource users is via periodic locally broadcast radio 
programs. The majority of forest income in the Bugoma forest site is for 
subsistence use; local resource users are generally excluded from accessing 
markets for high value forest products. In addition, few are aware of the value of 
the timber that is being harvested on private and customary lands in this area. The 
desire to clear land for agriculture often means that land owners will invite timber 
harvesters to cut large trees on their land for no cost, or for a payment far below 
market value.  
Findings for the Budongo forest site (that is, households living adjacent to 
the Central Forest Reserve managed by the National Forestry Authority) suggest 
that the reform has had a large and unexpected effect in this area. In the Budongo 
forest site the average increase in household forest income is 95,972 UgShs., or 
$53 USD. The differential effect of the reform on forest income for the poorest and 
wealthiest households is striking; households in the lowest income quartile have 
lost an average of 27,753 UgShs., or $15 USD per household, while households in 
the highest income quartile are estimated to have increased forest income by 
293,929 UgShs., or $162 USD per year. The share of income from forests has 
increased 6.4 percent for the average household. Regression results decomposed 
by income quartile indicate that the share of income from forests has declined for 
the poorest households (15 percent) and increased for the wealthiest households   25
(25 percent). For all models the estimated coefficients for the variable 
treatment_nfa*time were significant at the 1 percent or 5 percent level. The 
findings indicate that the forest sector reform in the Budongo forest site is strongly 
favoring the wealthiest households. As with the Bugoma Forest Site, the largest 
share of female headed households fall within the lowest two income quartiles (that 
is, 66 percent of female headed households). Only 13 percent of households falling 
within the highest income quartile are female headed: the reform is likely 
disproportionately benefiting male headed households. This is not surprising given 
the significant role of timber income in the large gains observed in the highest 
income quartile. Timber production is typically dominated by men.  
The extent to which wealthy households in the Budongo forest site are 
benefiting significantly from engagement in the timber business points to some 
serious flaws in the implementation of the reform. Currently there is no legal 
mechanism for smallholders living adjacent to Budongo Central Forest Reserve to 
harvest timber. As part of the transition to the National Forestry Authority the 
presence of forestry officials in the Budongo forest site has increased. However, 
based upon data collected for this study it appears that serious monitoring and 
enforcement failures are taking place; specifically, enforcement is selective and 
disproportionately focused on the lowest income households. Selective enforcement 
may be partially attributed to a change in the way forest guards are compensated. 
Lower pay and fewer allowances relative to management by the centralized Forest 
Department have created an incentive for forest guards to collude with illegal 
timber producers. In addition, relative wealth, which suggests sufficient capital to 
purchase timber harvesting equipment and to hire labor to harvest timber, and 
social and political capital are important determinants in the ability of households to 
engage in the timber business. The timber value chain is relatively short and 
frequently vertically integrated in the Budongo Forest Site; producers often harvest 
timber based upon orders placed by timber traders or wholesalers from Masindi 
town.  
CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
The aim of this paper is to examine how Uganda’s recent forest sector governance 
reform has affected the contribution of forests to rural incomes. While the reform is 
still in the early stages of implementation, the findings point to some striking 
changes or, in some cases, lack of change, in the role of forests in rural income 
portfolios in western Uganda. Overall, for Ugandans living in or near forests on 
private lands, the impact of the forest sector reform on rural livelihoods is 
negligible. Four years after the transition from Forest Department governance to 
District Forestry Service governance rural households have not increased the share 
of their income from forests through the sale of unprocessed or processed forest 
products.
14  While wealthy households obtain larger incomes from forests and a 
                                                      
 
14 Arguably 4-5 years is not a very long time period for which to evaluate the effects of Uganda’s 
forest sector reform. However, the findings from this study point to both limited effects (that is, the 
case of democratic decentralization) and significant changes (that is, the for-profit parastatal National 
Forestry Authority) that indicate the reform is having a limited effect or an effect that is contrary to 
the overarching objectives of both the new forest policy and National Forest Plan. Having this   26
larger share of total income from forests, the values are not large, and are 
indicative of the subsistence nature of forest product harvesting in this area. These 
findings indicate that forest sector decentralization to local government in Uganda 
has not had the desired outcome of increasing the role of forests in rural household 
income portfolios.    
A second story emerges from the analysis of the transition from Forest 
Department to National Forestry Authority in the Bugondo forest site. We found 
that relatively wealthy rural households living adjacent to the central forest reserve 
experienced large gains in income from forests, total income, and the share of 
income from forests. However, households in the lowest income quartiles 
experienced moderate losses in forest income and significant losses in the share of 
income from forests. The majority of forest income in the study area is from sawn 
wood, which is harvested and sold illegally. In this case livelihoods have been 
improved, but due to the institutional failure of the National Forestry Authority to 
regulate and enforce rules regarding timber harvesting. The transfer of 
responsibilities for central forest reserves to the National Forestry Authority has not 
had the desired effect. Forests have improved the livelihoods, but only for relatively 
wealthy households accessing forest products illegally.      
The extent of timber harvesting and marketing that is taking place in areas 
where these activities are known to be illegal is significant. The degree to which 
these activities are being undertaken by local elites needs to be further explored. 
These findings are consistent with Agrawal (2001), Platteau and Abraham (2002), 
and Ribot (1999), who cite numerous examples of local elites, NGOs, and other 
special interests dominating local decision making processes regarding the de facto 
assignment of rights, which tend to undermine outcomes for the rural poor.  
An important implication of these findings is the differential effect of the 
reform on relatively wealthy and relatively poor households. The findings highlight 
the importance of decomposing the data by income quartiles. The findings from this 
study are consistent with Jumbe and Angelsen (2006); Jagger, Pender and 
Gebremedhin (2005); and Sikor and Nguyen (2007), who found that reforms have 
differential effects across households and communities. Important patterns emerge 
from the analysis that would not be observable if average impacts across the whole 
sample were the focus of the analysis. Recall that the goals of FSUP were two—fold: 
to create a positive, effective, and sustainable policy and institutional environment 
for the forest sector in Uganda, and to increase economic and environmental 
benefits from forests and trees, particularly for the poor and vulnerable (MWLE 
2004a). This research demonstrates that households in different income quartiles 
are differentially dependent upon forests, and that that reform has affected 
different income groups in different ways. This finding supports both Larson et al. 
(2007) and Anderson and Gibson (2006), who point to the importance of 
monitoring the livelihood portfolios of those living in or near forests during policy 
implementation to ensure the poorest households are not disproportionately 
disadvantaged by governance reforms.  
                                                                                                                                                                           
 
information at an early stage of implementation is useful to donors, policy makers, bureaucrats 
charged with implementing reforms, civil society organizations, and local communities affected by the 
reform.     27
Several policy recommendations emerge from this research. First, in both the 
case of the decentralized DFS and the parastatal NFA there are few incentives for 
forestry officials to ensure that rural smallholders and, in particular the poor, have 
improved access to high value forest resources. Facilitating legalized engagement of 
local resource users in the sustainable harvesting of high value forest products and 
small scale forest enterprise development may increase awareness of the value of 
trees and forested land, increase income from forests, and reduce the incentive for 
corrupt officials to extract bribes from illegal producers. Second, the incentives of 
forestry officials should be carefully evaluated. Currently, there appear to be few 
incentives for forestry officials to do their jobs as they were envisioned. This 
includes evaluating hiring practices, performance evaluation, salaries, and so on. 
Third, in the control group site, collaborative forest management agreements and 
the sharing of tourism revenues with local communities has a favorable effect on 
both local livelihoods and forest management. Opportunities for community 
engagement in forest management should be pursued, with the caveat that 
successful collaborative forest management initiatives generally take a very long 
time to negotiate. Finally, the differential effect that the reform is having on the 
contribution of forests to the poor versus wealthy rural households points to the 
necessity of collecting data that can be used to monitor the progress of reforms as 
they are implemented. While Uganda is still in the early stages of implementation, 
these findings highlight the presence and magnitude of elite capture that has been 
anecdotally observed in numerous studies on the topic of decentralization and 
livelihoods.     28
REFERENCES  
Agrawal, A. 2001. The Regulatory Community: Decentralization and Environment in the Van Pachayats 
(Forest Councils) of Kumaon. Mountain Research and Development 21 (3):208-211. 
Agrawal, A. and C. Gibson. 1999. Enchantment and Disenchantment: The Role of Community in 
Natural Resource Conservation. World Development 27 (4):629-649. 
Agrawal, A. and E. Ostrom. 2001. Collective Action, Property Rights and Decentralization in Resource 
Use in India and Nepal. Politics and Society 29 (4):485–514. 
Andersson, K. and C. Gibson. 2006. Decentralized Governance and Environmental Change: Local 
Institutional Moderation of Deforestation in Bolivia. Journal of Policy Analysis and Management 
26 (1):99–123. 
Angelsen, A. and S. Wunder. 2003. Exploring the Forest—Poverty Link: Key Concepts, Issues and 
Research Implications. CIFOR Occasion Paper No. 40. Bogor, Indonesia: Center for 
International Forestry Research. 
Bardhan, P. 2002. Decentralization of Governance and Development. Journal of Economic Perspectives 
16 (4):185–205. 
Bush, G., S. Nampindo, C. Aguti, and A. Plumptre. 2004. The Value of Uganda's Forests: A Livelihoods 
and Ecosystems Approach. Kampala, Uganda: Wildlife Conservation Society. 
Cavendish, W. 2002. Quantitative Methods for Estimating the Economic Value of Resource Use to 
Rural Households In Uncovering the Hidden Harvest: Valuation Methods for Woodland and 
Forest Resources, Campbell, B. and M. Luckert, eds. London, UK: Earthscan Publications Ltd.  
Crook, R.C. and J. Manor. 1998. Democracy and Decentralization in Southeast Asia and West Africa: 
Participation, Accountability and Performance. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. 
Crook, R.C. and A. Sverrisson. 2001. Decentralization and Poverty Alleviation in Developing Countries: 
A Comparative Analysis or is West Bengal Unique? IDS Working Paper No. 120. Sussex, UK: 
Institute for Development Studies. 
Deininger, K. 2003. Land Policies for Growth and Poverty Reduction. Washington, DC: World Bank. 
DFID. 2007. Land: Better Access and Secure Tenure for Poor People. London, UK: Department for 
International Development. 
FAO. 2002. Land Tenure and Rural Development. FAO Land Tenure Studies No.3. Rome, Italy: Food 
and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations. 
Fisher, R.J., S. Maginnis, W.J. Jackson, E. Barrow, and S. Jeanrenaud. 2005. Poverty and 
Conservation: Landscapes, People and Power. Gland Switzerland and Cambridge, UK: IUCN. 
Gibson, C., McKean, M., and E. Ostrom. 2000. People and forests: Communities, institutions, and 
governance.  Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Government of Uganda. 2001. Uganda Forestry Policy. Kampala, Uganda: Ministry of Water, Lands 
and Environment. 
———. 2002. The National Forest Plan. Kampala, Uganda: Ministry of Water, Lands and Environment. 
———. 2004. The National Forestry and Tree Planting Act. Kampala, Uganda: Ministry of Water, Lands 
and Environment. 
Jagger, P., J. Pender, and B. Gebremedhin. 2005. Trading—off Environmental Sustainability for 
Empowerment and Income: Woodlot Devolution in Northern Ethiopia. World Development 33 
(9):1491–1510. 
Jumbe, C. and A. Angelsen. 2006. Do the Poor Benefit from Devolution Policies? Evidence from 
Malawi's Forest Co—Management Program. Land Economics 82 (4):562–581.   29
Kaimowitz, D., Vallejos, C., Pacheco, P. and R. López. 1998. Municipal Governments and Forest 
Management in Lowland Bolivia. Journal of Environment & Development 7 (1):45–59. 
Larson, A. 2002. Natural Resources and Decentralization in Nicaragua: Are Local Governments Up to 
the Job? World Development 30 (1):17–31. 
Larson, A., Pacheco, P.,Toni, F., and M. Vallejo. 2007. The Effects of Forestry Decentralization on 
Access to Livelihood Assets. Journal of Environment and Development 36 (3):251–268. 
Long, J. 1997. Regression Models for Categorical and Limited Dependent Variables. Thousand Oaks, 
CA: Sage Publications. 
MAAIF. 1995. Basic Facts on Agricultural Activities in Uganda. Kampala, Uganda: Ministry of 
Agriculture, Animal Industry and Fisheries. 
McCarthy, J. 2004. Changing to Gray: Decentralization and the Emergence of Volatile Socio—Legal 
Configurations in Central Kalimantan, Indonesia. World Development 32 (7):1199–1223. 
Meinzen-Dick, R., Di Gregorio, M., and N. McCarthy. 2004. Methods for Studying Collective Action in 
Rural Development. CAPRi Working Paper No. 33. Washington, DC: International Food Policy 
Research Institute. 
Meinzen-Dick, R. and A. Knox. 2001. Collective Action, Property Rights, and Devolution of Natural 
Resource Management: A Conceptual Framework. In Collective Action, Property Rights and 
Devolution of Natural Resource Management — Exchange of Knowledge and Implications for 
Policy, Meinzen—Dick, R., Knox, A., and M. Di Gregorio. Feldafing, Germany: Deutsche Stifung 
fur Internationale Entwicklung. 
MWLE. 2001. The Uganda Forest Policy. Kampala, Uganda: Ministry of Water, Lands and Environment. 
———. 2001a. Forest Sector Review. Kampala, Uganda: Ministry of Water, Lands and Environment. 
———. 2002. The National Forest Plan. Kampala, Uganda: Ministry of Water, Lands and Environment. 
———. 2003b. Guidelines for Implementing Collaborative Forest Management in Uganda. Kampala, 
Uganda: Ministry of Water, Lands and Environment. 
———. 2004a. Mapping the NFP Process: An Introduction to the Series. Uganda NFP Process Learning 
Series Note 1. Kampala: Ministry of Water, Lands and Environment (Forestry Inspection 
Division). 
———. 2006. National Forestry Authority 2004/2005 Annual Report. Kampala, Uganda: Ministry of 
Water, Lands and Environment. 
———. 2006. Reform of the Ministry of Water, Lands and Environment: Towards an Enabling 
Institutional Framework. Uganda NFP Process Learning Note 8. Kampala: Ministry of Water, 
Lands and Environment (Forestry Inspection Division). 
Ndegwa, S. 2002. Decentralization in Africa: A Stocktaking Survey.  Africa Regional Working Paper 
Series No. 40. Washington, DC: World Bank. 
Nzita, R. and M. Miwampa. 1993. Peoples and Cultures of Uganda. Kampala, Uganda: Fountain 
Publishers. 
Oyono, P.R. 2005. Profiling Local—level Outcomes of Environmental Decentralizations: The Case of 
Cameroon's Forests in the Congo Basin. Journal of Environment and Development 14 (2):1–
21. 
Palmer, C., and S. Engel. 2007. For Better or For Worse? Local Impacts of Decentralization of 
Indonesia's Forest Sector. World Development 35 (12):2131–2149. 
Platteau, J. and A. Abraham. 2002. Participatory Development in the Presence of Endogenous 
Community Imperfections. The Journal of Development Studies 39 (2):104–136. 
Ribot, J.C. 1999. Decentralization, Participation and Accountability in Sahelian Forestry: Legal 
Instruments of Political–Administrative Control. Africa 69 (1):23–65.   30
———. 2002. African Decentralization: Local Actors, Powers and Accountability. UNRISD Program on 
Democracy, Governance and Human Rights Paper No. 8. Geneva, Switzerland: United Nations 
Research Institute for Social Development. 
———. 2003. Democratic Decentralization of Natural Resources: Institutionalizing Popular 
Participation. Public Administration and Development 23:53–65. 
Ribot, J.C., and N.L. Peluso. 2003. A Theory of Access. Rural Sociology 68 (2): 153-181. 
Shadish, W.R., T.D. Cook, and D.T. Campbell. 2002. Experimental and Quasi-Experimental Designs for 
Generalized Causal Inference. Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflen Company. 
SIDA. 2007. Natural Resource Tenure. A Position Paper for SIDA. Stockholm, Sweden: Swedish 
International Development Cooperation Agency. 
Sikor, T., and T.Q. Nguyen. 2007. Why May Forest Devolution Not Benefit the Rural Poor? Forest 
Entitlements in Vietnam's Central Highlands. World Development 35 (11):2010–2025. 
UWA. 2004. Rwenzori Mountain National Park General Management Plan 2004–2014. Kampala, 
Uganda: Uganda Wildlife Authority. 
Vedeld, T.  2003. Democratic Decentralisation and Poverty Reduction: Exploring the Linkages. Forum 
for Development Studies 2:159–203. 
Wooldridge, J.M. 2002. Econometric Analysis of Cross Section and Panel Data. Boston, MA: MIT Press. 
World Bank. 2008. Poverty and the Environment: Understanding Linkages at the Household Level. 
Washington, DC: World Bank. 
WRI. 2003. World Resources 2002–2004 - Decisions for the Earth: Balance, Voice and Power. 
Washington, DC: World Resources Institute. 
WRI. 2005. World Resources 2005: The Wealth of the Poor: Managing ecosystems to fight poverty. 
Washington, DC: World Resources Institute. 
Wunsch, J.S. and D. Olowu. 1990. The Failure of the Centralized State. In The Failure of the 
Centralized State: Institutions and Self Governance in Africa, Wunsch, J. and D. Olowu, eds. 
Boulder, CO: Westview Press.   31
LIST OF CAPRi WORKING PAPERS 
01  Property Rights, Collective Action and Technologies for Natural Resource Management: A 
Conceptual Framework, by Anna Knox, Ruth Meinzen—Dick, and Peter Hazell, October 1998. 
02  Assessing the Relationships between Property Rights and Technology Adoption in Smallholder 
Agriculture: A Review of Issues and Empirical Methods, by Frank Place and Brent Swallow, 
April 2000. 
03  Impact of Land Tenure and Socioeconomic Factors on Mountain Terrace Maintenance in 
Yemen, by A. Aw—Hassan, M. Alsanabani and A. Bamatraf, July 2000. 
04  Land Tenurial Systems and the Adoption of a Mucuna Planted Fallow in the Derived Savannas 
of West Africa, by Victor M. Manyong and Victorin A. Houndékon, July 2000. 
05   Collective Action in Space: Assessing How Collective Action Varies Across an African 
Landscape, by Brent M. Swallow, Justine Wangila, Woudyalew Mulatu, Onyango Okello, and 
Nancy McCarthy, July 2000. 
06   Land Tenure and the Adoption of Agricultural Technology in Haiti, by Glenn R. Smucker, T. 
Anderson White, and Michael Bannister, October 2000. 
07   Collective Action in Ant Control, by Helle Munk Ravnborg, Ana Milena de la Cruz, María Del 
Pilar Guerrero, and Olaf Westermann, October 2000. 
08   CAPRi Technical Workshop on Watershed Management Institutions: A Summary Paper, by 
Anna Knox and Subodh Gupta, October 2000. 
09   The Role of Tenure in the Management of Trees at the Community Level: Theoretical and 
Empirical Analyses from Uganda and Malawi, by Frank Place and Keijiro Otsuka November 
2000. 
10   Collective Action and the Intensification of Cattle-Feeding Techniques a Village Case Study in 
Kenya‘s Coast Province, by Kimberly Swallow, November 2000. 
11   Collective Action, Property Rights, and Devolution of Natural Resource Management: Exchange 
of Knowledge and Implications for Policy, by Anna Knox and Ruth Meinzen-Dick, January 
2001. 
12   Land Dispute Resolution in Mozambique: Evidence and Institutions of Agroforestry Technology 
Adoption, by John Unruh, January 2001. 
13   Between Market Failure, Policy Failure, and .Community Failure.: Property Rights, Crop-
Livestock Conflicts and the Adoption of Sustainable Land Use Practices in the Dry Area of Sri 
Lanka, by Regina Birner and Hasantha Gunaweera, March 2001. 
14   Land Inheritance and Schooling in Matrilineal Societies: Evidence from Sumatra, by Agnes 
Quisumbing and Keijuro Otsuka, May 2001. 
15   Tribes, State, and Technology Adoption in Arid Land Management, Syria, by Rae, J, Arab, G., 
Nordblom, T., Jani, K., and Gintzburger, G., June 2001. 
16   The Effects of Scales, Flows, and Filters on Property Rights and Collective Action in Watershed 
Management, by Brent M. Swallow, Dennis P. Garrity, and Meine van Noordwijk, July 2001. 
17   Evaluating Watershed Management Projects, by John Kerr and Kimberly Chung, August 2001. 
18   Rethinking Rehabilitation: Socio-Ecology of Tanks and Water Harvesting in Rajasthan, North-
West India, by Tushaar Shah and K.V.Raju, September 2001. 
19   User Participation in Watershed Management and Research, by Nancy Johnson, Helle Munk 
Ravnborg, Olaf Westermann, and Kirsten Probst, September 2001. 
20   Collective Action for Water Harvesting Irrigation in the Lerman-Chapala Basin, Mexico, by 
Christopher A. Scott and Paul Silva-Ochoa, October 2001.   32
21   Land Redistribution, Tenure Insecurity, and Intensity of Production: A Study of Farm 
Households in Southern Ethiopia, by Stein Holden and Hailu Yohannes, October 2001. 
22   Legal Pluralism and Dynamic Property Rights, by Ruth Meinzen-Dick and Rajendra Pradhan, 
January 2002. 
23   International Conference on Policy and Institutional Options for the Management of 
Rangelands in Dry Areas, by Tidiane Ngaido, Nancy McCarthy, and Monica Di Gregorio, 
January 2002. 
24   Climatic Variablity and Cooperation in Rangeland Management: A Case Study From Niger, by 
Nancy McCarthy and Jean-Paul Vanderlinden, September 2002. 
25   Assessing the Factors Underlying the Differences in Group Performance: Methodological Issues 
and Empirical Findings from the Highlands of Central Kenya, by Frank Place, Gatarwa Kariuki, 
Justine Wangila, Patti Kristjanson, Adolf Makauki, and Jessica Ndubi, November 2002. 
26   The Importance of Social Capital in Colombian Rural Agro-Enterprises, by Nancy Johnson, Ruth 
Suarez, and Mark Lundy, November 2002. 
27   Cooperation, Collective Action and Natural Resources Management in Burkina Faso: A 
Methodological Note, by Nancy McCarthy, Céline Dutilly-Diané, and Boureima Drabo, 
December 2002. 
28   Understanding, Measuring and Utilizing Social Capital: Clarifying Concepts and Presenting a 
Field Application from India, by Anirudh Krishna, January 2003. 
29   In Pursuit Of Comparable Concepts and Data, about Collective Action, by Amy Poteete And 
Elinor Ostrom, March 2003. 
30   Methods of Consensus Building for Community Based Fisheries Management in Bangladesh 
and the Mekong Delta, by Parvin Sultana and Paul Thompson, May 2003. 
31   Formal and Informal Systems in Support of Farmer Management of Agrobiodiversity: Some 
Policy Challenges to Consolidate Lessons Learned, by Marie Byström, March 2004. 
32   What Do People Bring Into the Game: Experiments in the Field About Cooperation in the 
Commons, by Juan-Camilo Cárdenas and Elinor Ostrom, June 2004. 
33   Methods for Studying Collective Action in Rural Development, by Ruth Meinzen-Dick, Monica Di 
Gregorio, and Nancy McCarthy, July 2004. 
34   The Relationship between Collective Action and Intensification of Livestock Production: The 
Case of Northeastern Burkina Faso, by Nancy McCarthy, August 2004. 
35   The Transformation of Property Rights in Kenya‘s Maasailand: Triggers and Motivations by 
Esther Mwangi, January 2005. 
36   Farmers‘ Rights and Protection of Traditional Agricultural Knowledge, by Stephen B. Brush, 
January 2005. 
37   Between Conservationism, Eco-Populism and Developmentalism – Discourses in Biodiversity 
Policy in Thailand and Indonesia, by Heidi Wittmer and Regina Birner, January 2005. 
38   Collective Action for the Conservation of On-Farm Genetic Diversity in a Center of Crop 
Diversity: An Assessment of the Role of Traditional Farmers‘ Networks, by Lone B. Badstue, 
Mauricio R. Bellon, Julien Berthaud, Alejandro Ramírez, Dagoberto Flores, Xóchitl Juárez, and 
Fabiola Ramírez, May 2005. 
39   Institutional Innovations Towards Gender Equity in Agrobiodiversity Management: Collective 
Action in Kerala, South India,, by Martina Aruna Padmanabhan, June 2005. 
40   The Voracious Appetites of Public versus Private Property: A View of Intellectual Property and 
Biodiversity from Legal Pluralism, by Melanie G. Wiber, July 2005. 
41   Who Knows, Who Cares? Determinants of Enactment, Awareness and Compliance with 
Community Natural Resource Management Bylaws in Uganda, by Ephraim Nkonya, John 
Pender, Edward Kato, Samuel Mugarura, and James Muwonge, August 2005.   33
42   Localizing Demand and Supply of Environmental Services: Interactions with Property Rights, 
Collective Action and the Welfare of the Poor, by Brent Swallow, Ruth Meinzen-Dick, and Meine 
von Noordjwik, September 2005. 
43   Initiatives for Rural Development through Collective Action: The Case of Household 
Participation in Group Activities in the Highlands of Central Kenya, By Gatarwa Kariuki and 
Frank Place, September 2005. 
44   Are There Customary Rights to Plants? An Inquiry among the Baganda (Uganda), with Special 
Attention to Gender, by Patricia L. Howard and Gorettie Nabanoga, October 2005. 
45   On Protecting Farmers‘ New Varieties: New Approaches to Rights on Collective Innovations in 
Plant Genetic Resources by Rene Salazar, Niels P. Louwaars, and Bert Visser, January 2006. 
46   Subdividing the Commons: The Politics of Property Rights Transformation in Kenya‘s 
Maasailand, by Esther Mwangi, January 2006. 
47   Biting the Bullet: How to Secure Access to Drylands Resources for Multiple Users, by Esther 
Mwangi and Stephan Dohrn, January 2006. 
48   Property Rights and the Management of Animal Genetic Resources, by Simon Anderson and 
Roberta Centonze, February 2006. 
49   From the Conservation of Genetic Diversity to the Promotion of Quality Foodstuff: Can the 
French Model of =Appellation d‘Origine Contrôlée‘ be Exported? by Valérie Boisvert, April 
2006. 
50   Facilitating Collective Action and Enhancing Local Knowledge: A Herbal Medicine Case Study in 
Talaandig Communities, Philippines, by Herlina Hartanto and Cecil Valmores, April 2006. 
51   Water, Women and Local Social Organization in the Western Kenya Highlands, by Elizabeth 
Were, Brent Swallow, and Jessica Roy, July 2006. 
52   The Many Meanings of Collective Action: Lessons on Enhancing Gender Inclusion and Equity in 
Watershed Management, by Laura German, Hailemichael Taye, Sarah Charamila, Tesema 
Tolera, and Joseph Tanui, July 2006. 
53   Decentralization and Environmental Conservation: Gender Effects from Participation in Joint 
Forest Management, by Arun Agrawal, Gautam Yadama, Raul Andrade, and Ajoy 
Bhattacharya, July 2006. 
54   Improving the Effectiveness of Collective Action: Sharing Experiences from Community 
Forestry in Nepal, by Krishna P. Achyara and Popular Gentle, July 2006. 
55   Groups, Networks, and Social Capital in the Philippine Communities, by Marie Godquin and 
Agnes R. Quisumbing, October 2006. 
56   Collective Action in Plant Genetic Resources Management: Gendered Rules of Reputation, 
Trust and Reciprocity in Kerala, India, by Martina Aruna Padmanabhan, October 2006. 
57   Gender and Local Floodplain Management Institutions-A case study from Bangladesh, by 
Parvin Sultana and Paul Thompson, October 2006. 
58   Gender Differences in Mobilization for Collective Action: Case Studies of Villages in Northern 
Nigeria, by Saratu Abdulwahid, October 2006. 
59   Gender, Social Capital and Information Exchange in Rural Uganda, by Enid Katungi, Svetlana 
Edmeades, and Melinda Smale, October 2006. 
60   Rural Institutions and Producer Organizations in Imperfect Markets: Experiences from 
Producer Marketing Groups in Semi-Arid Eastern Kenya, by Bekele Shiferaw, Gideon Obare 
and Geoffrey Muricho, November 2006. 
61   Women‘s Collective Action and Sustainable Water Management: Case of SEWA‘s Water 
Campaign in Gujarat, India, by Smita Mishra Panda, October 2006.   34
62   Could Payments for Environmental Services Improve Rangeland Management in Central Asia, 
West Asia and North Africa? by Celine Dutilly-Diane, Nancy McCarthy, Francis Turkelboom, 
Adriana Bruggeman, James Tiedemann, Kenneth Street and Gianluca Serra, January 2007. 
63   Empowerment through Technology: Gender Dimensions of Social Capital Build-Up in 
Maharashtra, India, by Ravula Padmaja and Cynthia Bantilan, February 2007. 
64   Gender and Collective Action: A Conceptual Framework for Analysis, by Lauren Pandolfelli, 
Ruth Meinzen-Dick, and Stephan Dohrn, May 2007. 
65   Gender, Wealth, and Participation in Community Groups in Meru Central District, Kenya, by 
Kristin E. Davis and Martha Negash, May 2007. 
66   Beyond Group Ranch Subdivision: Collective Action for Livestock Mobility, Ecological Viability, 
and Livelihoods, by Shauna BurnSilver and Esther Mwangi, June 2007. 
67   Farmer Organization, Collective Action and Market Access in Meso-America, by Jon Hellin, 
Mark Lundy, and Madelon Meijer, October 2007. 
68   Collective Action for Innovation and Small Farmer Market Access: The Papa Andina 
Experience, by André Devaux, Claudio Velasco, Gastón López, Thomas Bernet, Miguel 
Ordinola, Hernán Pico, Graham Thiele, and Douglas Horton, October 2007. 
69   Collective Action and Marketing of Underutilized Plant Species: The Case of Minor Millets in 
Kolli Hills, Tamil Nadu, India, by Guillaume P. Gruère, Latha Nagarajan, and E.D.I. Oliver King, 
M.S. Swaminathan Research Foundation, October 2007. 
70  The Role of Public–Private Partnerships and Collective Action in Ensuring Smallholder 
Participation in High Value Fruit and Vegetable Supply Chains, by Clare Narrod, Devesh Roy, 
Julius Okello, Belem Avendaño, and Karl Rich, October 2007. 
71  Collective Action for Small-Scale Producers of Agricultural Biodiversity Products, by Froukje 
Kruijssen, Menno Keizer, and Alessandra Giuliani, October, 2007. 
72  Farmer Groups Enterprises and the Marketing of Staple Food Commodities in Africa, by 
Jonathan Coulter, October 2007. 
73  Linking Collective Action to Non-Timber Forest Product Market for Improved Local Livelihoods: 
Challenges and Opportunities, by Heru Komarudin, Yuliana L. Siagian, and Ngakan Putu Oka, 
December, 2007. 
74  Collective Action Initiatives to Improve Marketing Performance: Lessons from Farmer Groups 
in Tanzania, by James Barham and Clarence Chitemi, March 2008. 
75  Sustaining Linkages to High Value Markets through Collective Action In Uganda: The Case of 
the Nyabyumba Potato Farmers, by Elly Kaganzi, Shaun Ferris, James Barham, Annet 
Abenakyo, Pascal Sanginga, and Jemimah Njuki, March 2008. 
76  Fluctuating Fortunes of a Collective Enterprise: The Case of the Agroforestry Tree Seeds 
Association of Lantapan (ATSAL) in the Philippines, by Delia Catacutan, Manuel Bertomeu, 
Lyndon Arbes, Caroline Duque, and Novie Butra, May 2008. 
77  Making Market Information Services Work Better for the Poor in Uganda, by Shaun Ferris, 
Patrick Engoru, and Elly Kaganzi, May 2008. 
78  Implications of Bulk Water Transfer on Local Water Management Institutions: A Case Study of 
the Melamchi Water Supply Project in Nepal, by Dhruba Pant, Madhusudan Bhattarai, and 
Govinda Basnet, May 2008. 
79  Bridging, Linking and Bonding Social Capital in Collective Action: The Case of Kalahan Forest 
Reserve in the Philippines, by Ganga Ram Dahal and Krishna Prasad Adhikari, May 2008. 
80  Decentralization, Pro–poor Land Policies, and Democratic Governance, by Ruth Meinzen–Dick, 
Monica Di Gregorio, and Stephan Dohrn, June 2008.   35
81  Property Rights, Collective Action, and Poverty: The Role of Institutions for Poverty Reduction, 
by Monica Di Gregorio, Konrad Hagedorn, Michael Kirk, Benedikt Korf, Nancy McCarthy, Ruth 
Meinzen–Dick, and Brent Swallow, June 2008. 
82  Collective Action and Property Rights for Poverty Reduction: A Review of Methods and 
Approaches, by Esther Mwangi and Helen Markelova, June 2008. 
83  Collective action and vulnerability: Burial societies in rural Ethiopia, by Stefan Dercon, John 
Hoddinott, Pramila Krishnan, and Tassew Woldehanna, June 2008. 
84  Collective Action and Vulnerability:  Local and Migrant Networks in Bukidnon, Philippines, by 
Agnes Quisumbing, Scott McNiven, and Marie Godquin, June 2008.  
85  Community Watershed Management in Semi–Arid India: The State of Collective Action and its 
Effects on Natural Resources and Rural Livelihoods, by Bekele Shiferaw, Tewodros Kebede, 
and V. Ratna Reddy, June 2008.  
86  Enabling Equitable Collective Action and Policy Change for Poverty Reduction and Improved 
Natural Resource Management in the Eastern African Highlands, by Laura German, Waga 
Mazengia, Wilberforce Tirwomwe, Shenkut Ayele, Joseph Tanui, Simon Nyangas, Leulseged 
Begashaw, Hailemichael Taye, Zenebe Admassu, Mesfin Tsegaye, Francis Albino, Ashenafi 
Mekonnen, Kassahun Aberra, Awadh Chemangei, William Cheptegei, Tessema Tolera, Zewude 
Jote, and Kiflu Bedane, June 2008. 
87  The Transformation of the Afar Commons in Ethiopia: State Coercion, Diversification, and 
Property Rights Change among Pastoralists, by Bekele Hundie and Martina Padmanabhan, 
June 2008. 
88  Unmaking the Commons: Collective Action, Property Rights, and Resource Appropriation 
among (Agro–) Pastoralists in Eastern Ethiopia, by Fekadu Beyene and Benedikt Korf, June 
2008. 
89  Escaping Poverty Traps? Collective Action and Property Rights in Post–War Rural Cambodia, by 
Anne Weingart and Michael Kirk, June 2008. 
90  Collective Action to Secure Property Rights for the Poor – A Case Study in Jambi Province, 
Indonesia, by Heru Komarudin, Yuliana Sigian, and Carol Colfer, June 2008. 
91  Land Tenure in Ethiopia: Continuity and Change, Shifting Rulers, and the Quest For State 
Control by Wibke Crewett, Ayalneh Bogale, and Benedikt Korf. September 2008. 